Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization
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Preface

The United States is unparalleled in its commitment to protecting Americans’ liberties and freedoms and is unmatched in its national security infrastructure. Hardworking Americans have built the world’s largest economy and solved some of the world’s greatest challenges through innovations in science and technology. It is imperative for the Federal Government to leverage these innovations to provide better service for its citizens in the most cost-effective and secure manner. This Administration has prioritized modernization of Federal information technology (IT) systems, and to that end, has committed to help agencies better leverage American innovations through increased use of commercial technology.

As a demonstration of this commitment, on May 1, 2017, the President established the American Technology Council (ATC) to effectuate the secure and efficient use of IT across the Federal Government.¹ Just days later, on May 11, 2017, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.² The latter EO tasks the Director of ATC to coordinate a report to the President from the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA), in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce (Commerce), regarding the modernization of Federal IT.

Acknowledging that Federal agencies are still working, and must continue to work, to meet the objectives of other critical modernization initiatives – for instance, by automating their manual processes, deploying patches both responsively and preventatively, and by transitioning away from unsupported software – this report outlines the current and envisioned state of Federal IT, and it provides specific recommendations to jumpstart a new wave of modernization efforts.

The enclosed plan incorporates the efforts of key Government stakeholders in identifying ways for the Government to enhance its cybersecurity posture, modernize the Federal IT enterprise, and create a more robust partnership between Government and industry. Additionally, the ATC has convened top private and public sector leaders to elicit and incorporate input on the vision for the future of Federal IT, and it intends to seek further input to ensure successful implementation of modernization recommendations.

Executive Summary

This report outlines a vision and recommendations for the Federal Government to build a more modern and secure architecture for Federal IT systems. Agencies have attempted to modernize their systems but have been stymied as a result of a variety of factors, including resource prioritization, ability to procure services quickly, and technical issues. Recommendations to address the aforementioned issues are grouped into two categories of effort: the modernization and consolidation of networks, and the use of shared services to enable future network architectures. In addition to specific recommendations, this report outlines an agile process for updating policies and reference architectures to help the Government more rapidly leverage American innovation. In recognition of the importance of industry to Federal IT Modernization efforts, it is our recommendation that the President release this report for public feedback, have the ATC, OMB, DHS, Commerce, and GSA adjudicate industry feedback, and then resubmit a final report to the President that directly incorporates this feedback.

Network Modernization and Consolidation. This report envisions a modern Federal IT architecture where agencies are able to maximize secure use of cloud computing, modernize Government-hosted applications, and securely maintain legacy systems. Specific actions in this report focus on the first two areas, where securely maintaining legacy systems is addressed in other areas of EO 13800. These actions enable agencies to move from protection of their network perimeters and managing legacy physical deployments toward protection of Federal data and cloud-optimized deployments. The report also emphasizes a risk-based approach that focuses agency resources on their highest value assets, per OMB’s authorities provided by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) and OMB Memorandum M-17-25, Reporting Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure. The report addresses current impediments obstacles to adopting modernized cloud technologies by piloting new implementation approaches, and using these test cases to inform rapid policy updates. The report also focuses on consolidating and improving acquisition of network services so that management of security services for networks are consolidated where possible and managed to high standards. Specific actions include:

1. **Prioritize the Modernization of High-Risk High Value Assets (HVAs).**
   Prioritize modernization of legacy IT by focusing on enhancement of security and privacy controls for those assets that are essential for Federal agencies to serve the American people and whose security posture is most vulnerable.

2. **Modernize the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) Program to Enable Cloud Migration.** Use real world implementation test cases to identify solutions to current barriers regarding agency cloud adoption. Update relevant network security policies and architectures to enable agencies to focus on both network and data-level security and privacy, while ensuring incident detection and prevention capabilities are modernized to address the latest threats.

3. **Consolidate Network Acquisitions and Management.** Consolidate and standardize network and security service acquisition to take full advantage of economies of scale, while minimizing duplicative investments in existing security capabilities.

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3 Not to include national security systems as defined in Section 3552(b)(6) of Title 44, United States Code.

**Shared Services to Enable Future Network Architectures.** The following section of this report lays out an approach to enable, with ongoing Government-wide category management efforts, the Federal Government to shift toward a consolidated IT model by adopting centralized offerings for commodity IT. The recommendations detail steps to address current impediments in policy, resource allocation, and agency prioritization to enabling the use of cloud, collaboration tools, and other security shared services. Specific actions include:

1. **Enable use of Commercial Cloud.** Improve contract vehicles to enable agencies to acquire commercial cloud products that meet Government standards.

2. **Accelerate Adoption of Cloud Email and Collaboration Tools.** Provide support for migration to cloud email and collaboration suites that leverage the Government’s buying power. Define the next set of agencies to migrate to commercial email and collaboration suites.

3. **Improve Existing and Provide Additional Security Shared Services.** Provide centralized capabilities that replace or augment existing agency-specific technology to improve both visibility and security.

**Resourcing Federal Network IT Modernization.** In order to implement the Federal IT modernization efforts outlined in this report, agencies will need to realign their IT resources appropriately using business-focused, data-driven analysis and technical evaluation. OMB will inform agencies that agency Chief Information Officers (CIOs) work with their Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) and Senior Agency Officials for Privacy (SAOPs), in consultation with OMB, to determine which of their systems will be prioritized for modernization, identifying strategies to reallocate resources appropriately. In accordance with the terms of agency contracts and consistent with law, agencies should consider immediately pausing or halting upcoming procurement actions that further develop or enhance legacy IT systems identified that need modernization. Agencies should also emphasize reprioritizing funds and should consider "cut and invest" strategies that reallocate funding from obsolete legacy IT systems to modern technologies, cloud solutions, and shared services, using agile development practices where appropriate.

Taken together, these recommendations will modernize the security and functionality of Federal IT, allow the Federal Government to improve service delivery, and focus effort and resources on what is most important to customers of Government services.
Network Modernization & Consolidation

Summary of Efforts to Date

The Federal Government has engaged in several efforts to modernize existing IT systems, to improve processes for the acquisition and development of new solutions, and to restructure underlying frameworks for service and lifecycle management. The E-Government Act of 2002 recognized the importance of a well-managed, modern, and secure Federal IT ecosystem, building upon concepts captured in the Clinger-Cohen Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, and OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource.5 Additionally, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 and its reauthorization in 2014 serve as the governing authority for OMB to provide overall guidance and policy for Government-wide Federal cybersecurity.

Pursuant to these authorities, OMB established the IT Infrastructure Optimization Line of Business, which developed common Government-wide performance measures for service levels and costs, identified best practices, and provided guidance for agency IT infrastructure transition plans. An Enterprise Architecture and Centralizing Infrastructure was constructed some years later, and in 2010, the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) directed agencies to inventory their data centers, develop consolidation plans, and assess virtual or cloud alternatives.6

Between the launch of the FDCCI and its conclusion in 2015, the Cloud First Initiative and the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) was activated in 2011 with FedRAMP providing a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products and services. Driven by the momentum of these and other efforts, in 2016 the Data Center Optimization Initiative arose as an update to the FDCCI based on requirements of the Federal IT Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA).7 These efforts have helped agencies to begin modernizing their IT. This report is intended to help resolve some of the impediments surfaced throughout implementation of these efforts and accelerate Federal IT Modernization.

Current State

In recent years, Government-wide initiatives and policies have focused on the transition to a more efficient, more secure, and customer-focused IT environment. The preponderance of efforts to protect Federal IT systems to date have been focused at the network level. This drove agencies to consolidate human and technical resources around a limited number of connections and standardized physical access points, with the intent of producing more robust security management.

Current policy, agency prioritization, and associated investments prioritized through the budget process have emphasized perimeter network-based security protections. This is manifested most

visibly through the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) programs. This report recommends emphasizing a layered defensive strategy in Government-wide programs, through increasing emphasis on application and data-level protections. This shift in focus, coupled with lessons learned from the current implementation and advances in technology will drive strategic changes to the NCPS program, as described in Appendix C. It will also provide greater defense-in-depth capabilities that will help prevent malicious actors from moving laterally across linked networks to access large amounts of valuable information.

These well-intentioned initiatives have resulted in security implementations that negatively affect performance and create barriers to use of commercial technology. As an example, policy and existing implementation of enterprise cybersecurity tools drives the physical consolidation of all network traffic to and from Federal information systems. This hampers agencies’ ability to acquire new technologies like commercial cloud, which rely on a distributed network model and emphasize optimization of virtual rather than physical controls of data. In this case, policies and supporting capabilities which require routing all traffic through a limited number of on premise access points not only impacts service performance and availability, but it also undermines the value proposition of a distributed cloud architecture and flexible mobile access to services.

Consequently, in order to successfully meet their mission and business objectives, agencies often circumvent network-based security protections to use commercial cloud. Another negative consequence of overreliance on network-based protections is the emergence of operational capability gaps at other levels, such as the data and application levels. This has resulted in overlooked areas of the IT ecosystem, which are more vulnerable and at higher risk of attack or exploit.

Additionally, when individual agencies issue agency-specific IT contracts, they reinforce the current emphasis on boundary protections and limit opportunities for applying economies of scale in provisioning common network and security services for the Federal Government. Small agencies, especially, often lack staff resources and technical expertise to securely manage existing networks, migrate to new computing models, and navigate security acquisition processes. Enabling a new approach to modernization and consolidation of networks requires a strategy that addresses each of these challenges with associated recommendations for legal, policy, resource allocation, acquisition, and workforce interventions, as detailed further below.

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8 The TIC and NCPS initiatives are further described in the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (CNCl), established by Joint Presidential Directive NSPD-54/HSPD-23; OMB Memorandum M-08-16, Guidance for TIC Statement of Capability Form (SOC); OMB Memorandum M-08-26, Transition from FTS 2001 to Networx; OMB Memorandum M-08-27, Guidance for TIC Compliance; OMB Memorandum M-09-32, Update on the TIC Initiative; and DHS’s TIC Reference Architecture. These documents provide further details on agency, OMB, and DHS responsibilities and reporting requirements, acquisition vehicles, and technical capabilities under the TIC initiative. The Homeland Security Act, as amended by section 223 of the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, Division N, Title II, Subtitle B), requires DHS to “deploy, operate, and maintain” and “make available for use by any agency” capabilities to detect cybersecurity risks in agency network traffic and take actions to mitigate those risks (6 U.S.C. § 151(b)(1)). DHS currently provides these capabilities through its NCPS program and, as required by law, ensures all retention, use, and disclosure of information obtained through NCPS occurs only for protecting information and information systems from cybersecurity risks (See id. § 151(c)(9)). The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 also requires agencies to apply these capabilities to “all information traveling between an agency information system and any information system other than an agency information system.” Id. § 151, note. Notably, these statutory provisions have flexibility regarding the technological means through which DHS offers these intrusion detection and prevention capabilities and is not tied to the current NCPS implementation. Indeed, the Homeland Security Act encourages development of these capabilities by requiring DHS to “regularly assess through operational test and evaluation in real world or simulated environments available advanced protective technologies to improve detection and prevention capabilities, including commercial and noncommercial technologies and detection technologies beyond signature-based detection, and acquire, test, and deploy such technologies when appropriate.” Id. § 151(c)(4).
**Future State & Objectives**

The future of Federal IT is one in which agencies move further toward a risk-based approach to securing their systems that places appropriate emphasis on data-level protections and that fully leverages modern virtualized technologies. This renewed focus on data-level protections for managing risk must be accepted and driven by agency leadership, mission owners, IT practitioners, and oversight bodies. Specific recommendations that will bridge to this future state are detailed in the next section, titled “Implementation Plan.” The following broad objectives will drive momentum toward the future state of IT:

- **Reduce the Federal attack surface through enhanced application and data-level protections.**
  
  Rather than treating Federal networks as trusted entities to be defended at the perimeter, agencies should shift their focus to placing protections closer to data, specifically through improved management and authentication of devices and user access, as well as through encryption of data – both at rest and in transit. This approach curtails an attacker’s likelihood of gaining access to valuable data solely by accessing the network, and it has the potential to better block and isolate malicious activity. As agencies prioritize their modernization efforts, they should implement the capabilities that underpin this model to their high value assets first.

- **Improve visibility beyond the network level.**
  
  Agencies will gain greater visibility and resilience against more sophisticated attacks, including insider threats that may have access to agency-owned networks by enhancing protections closer to the data. Expanding visibility beyond the network level – for instance, through collecting security logs at the application level – provides security teams with other information feeds, which they can use to better understand, process, and triage information security events and possible incidents. This information can provide insight into the gaps in security that agencies are experiencing, which informs the types of investments they should make to defend against modern threats. Maximizing the effectiveness of this approach requires updating tools and models by which staff conduct operational security to detect and prevent intrusions. It also requires risk proportionate application of security practices and maintenance of situational awareness, particularly in scenarios in which Federal information resides in an off-premises environment, such as in commercially-provided clouds. Government-wide programs designed to deliver these tools and services must evolve, as must the operational culture by which agencies collect and analyze logs.

- **Ensure that policy, resource allocation, acquisition, and operational approaches to security enable use of new technology without sacrificing reliability or performance.**
  
  Information Technology policy, resource allocations, acquisition processes, and operational guidance must enable the achievement of security objectives while also allowing agencies to take advantage of newer approaches to technology, such as commercial cloud-based services and mobile devices. Agencies should prioritize the IT resources and technical personnel they need to implement necessary data protections and provide situational awareness in their daily
operations. This must be done regardless of whether information is stored on premises or in a commercial cloud. While some successes have occurred in the Federal Government, many real or perceived impediments remain to accelerating network consolidation and optimization on a Government-wide scale. The recommendations in this report collectively address and seek to remedy impediments to modernizing Federal IT. Addressing these barriers will enable agencies to accelerate toward a new era of modernization without sacrificing security or performance.

Implementation Plan

This section outlines immediate next steps and long-term considerations related to the modernization of Federal networks. The focus areas below accelerate Federal efforts on three core concepts: (1) prioritizing high value assets; (2) adopting security frameworks that better protect systems at the data level; and (3) consolidating and standardizing network acquisitions and management wherever possible.

1. Prioritize the Modernization of High-Risk High Value Assets (HVAs)

The HVA Initiative, beginning in 2015, was a seminal step in helping the Federal Government recognize, categorize, and prioritize modernization and security improvements for the primary benefit of its “crown jewel” systems.9 The implementation plan outlined below goes a step further by recommending specific policy, resource allocation, and other interventions to provide near-term assistance to agencies as they strengthen their ability to protect these assets, which are susceptible to the greatest amount of cybersecurity risk. It leverages the current ATC supported efforts to improve the Authority to Operate (ATO) process, and it corresponds with the direction set forth in Section 1 of EO 13800, which mandates that all agencies perform a risk assessment and identify areas in which additional attention is needed. This is consistent with agency responsibilities under FISMA.

Simply applying the next set of patches to these systems and tacking on additional tools is no longer sufficient; rather, HVAs must be driven toward implementation of modern architectures that are based on data-level protections. Systems that are most important to the Federal Government, yet are also most vulnerable, should be addressed first.

Next steps to support this recommendation are as follows:

**Immediate Action:**

It is recommended that the President direct the implementation of the plan outlined below to improve the security of high-risk HVAs by migrating to a modernized architecture and employing security best practices.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 30 Days:**

Consistent with relevant portions of the enterprise risk management plan to be developed pursuant to Section 1(c)(iv) of EO 13800, Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will provide OMB with a plan to promote a risk management culture that focuses agency effort on the operational performance and compliance of their most valuable

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9 OMB Memorandum M-17-09, Management of Federal High Value Assets.
systems, while simultaneously allowing for the deployment of low-impact systems in a less burdensome and less costly manner. This plan will include a process and timeline for revising Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 199, *Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems*, and FIPS Publication 200, *Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems*. The plan should also include proposed updates to any other relevant NIST Special Publications (SPs) to enable and support improvements in agency risk management processes that lead to the appropriate selection, implementation, and continuous monitoring of controls and capabilities commensurate with the risk to information, systems, agency missions, and individuals. These updates should include the use of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework), and, where appropriate, incorporate lessons from other control and compliance frameworks, such as ISO, SOC 2 Compliance Audits, and Payment Card Industry. These updates should review the security requirements for these other frameworks and system approval processes used, and assess the use of overlays of these frameworks as a viable approach and intended for inclusion into the proposed updates of the relevant Special Publications.

CIOs, Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), and SAOPs will review their latest submission of HVAs to the DHS and OMB, and will make any necessary changes to reflect the latest information on system prioritization in tandem with the assessments made under their risk assessments as part of Section 1 of Executive Order 13800.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 60 Days:**

Consistent with Section 1(c)(iv)(B) of EO 13800, DHS, in consultation with OMB, will provide a report which identifies common areas of weakness in Government HVAs. The report will include recommendations for addressing these risks Government-wide, informed by agency risk assessments, as well as past and current Risk Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs), and Security Architecture Reviews (SARs) DHS has performed on various agency HVAs.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 75 Days:**

Consistent with Section 1(c)(iv)(B) of EO 13800 and in execution of independent statutory authorities, OMB, in consultation with DHS, will develop a strategy and framework for an approach that clearly describes the lines of authority and operating procedures necessary to optimally leverage resources across agencies in order to reduce the risk to the Federal enterprise in response to cybersecurity incidents. These efforts should align with the plan to adequately protect the executive branch enterprise in response to agency risk management reports, per Section 1.c.iv of EO 13800.

Pursuant to its statutory authorities and in execution thereof, OMB will update the annual FISMA metrics as well as the Cybersecurity Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) Goal metrics to focus on those critical capabilities that are most commonly lacking among agencies. OMB will focus oversight efforts, including CyberStat Reviews and President’s Management Council (PMC) Cybersecurity Assessments, on driving progress on these capabilities, with a specific focus on HVAs.
DHS, in consultation with OMB will direct Government-wide mitigation actions to address common areas of risk identified in the Report to the President on Risk Management in accordance with their authorities under FISMA and other relevant statutory authority.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 80 Days:**

Consistent with the current HVA Program that is administered by DHS and overseen by OMB, any agency that has an HVA that has been identified as having a major or critical weakness in either a risk assessment, RVA, SAR, or Inspector General (IG) report will identify a remediation plan, including a proposal for accelerating modernization within one year and identification of impediments in policy, resource allocation, workforce, or operations. This plan should maximize use of shared IT services, implement application and data-level protections, and emphasize appropriate use of commercial cloud-based architectures. Specific recommendations for modern security approaches are detailed in Appendix A. Agencies should prioritize existing financial and human resources and should identify other systems of concern that may suffer from similar issues, but that are not categorized as HVAs.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 100 Days:**

DHS, OMB, and the National Security Council (NSC) will review HVA lists submitted to DHS by Federal agencies and will produce a prioritized list of systems for Government-wide intervention. Six HVAs will be selected to receive centralized interventions in staffing and technical support, and the broader, prioritized list will be vetted by the PMC. Additionally, agencies will work with OMB to reallocate their IT resources appropriately in order to align and appropriately resource the modernization of HVAs.

Where possible and subject to funding, OMB, through the U.S. Digital Service (USDS), and GSA will support DHS in providing hands-on technical assistance to agencies in bolstering protections for systems identified through this process as having the greatest need for modernization.

Additionally, DHS will work to expand the availability of RVAs and SARs for agency HVAs. OMB will also work with DHS to refocus these assessments to concentrate on hands-on technical engineering interventions, de-emphasizing the review of system documentation and policies. In addition, OMB and DHS will work with GSA to expand the visibility, offerings, and agency use of the Highly Adaptive Cybersecurity Services Special Item Numbers (HACS SINs) on IT Schedule 70.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 365 Days:**

Pursuant to its statutory authorities and in execution thereof, OMB, will work with DHS, GSA, and other stakeholders to capture standard operating procedures for the protection of HVAs and will develop a playbook that agencies can leverage to expand this approach to other systems in a prioritized, risk-based fashion in accordance with FISMA.

2. **Modernize the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) to Improve Protections, Remove Barriers, and Enable Commercial Cloud Migration.**
The perimeter-based security model employed by Federal agencies today, formalized in OMB Memorandum M-08-05, Implementation of Trusted Internet Connections (TIC), focuses on standardizing security at the network boundary by consolidating external access points. Under this model, agencies are required to reduce external connections to a target of 50 and route their traffic through this limited number of secure gateways. These gateways apply common security protections, as well as common intrusion detection, information sharing, and prevention capabilities under DHS’s NCPS. NCPS consists of three sensor capabilities, collectively referred to as EINSTEIN, as well as a set of analytic tools used by cyber analysts to find, identify and categorize cyber threat activity.\(^{10}\)

The NCPS sensor suite is deployed in three iterations: EINSTEIN 1, which captures and analyzes network flow information; EINSTEIN 2, which incorporates intrusion detection technology that scans the content of network communications to identify and alert to known indications of malicious activity; and EINSTEIN 3-Accelerated (E3A), which detects and blocks malicious activity through domain name systems (DNS) sinkholing and email filtering. The TIC policy, and subsequently the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, requires agencies to utilize these capabilities, which are currently provided through NCPS, to protect all information traveling between an agency information system and any external information system.\(^{11}\) This perimeter-based model sought to provide a means to aggregate all Federal Executive Branch traffic so that the Government can apply common methods, such as classified indicators, to protect against information security threats, and maintain consistent situational awareness.

This approach of perimeter-based network security has created several challenges for agencies wishing to take advantage of commercial cloud services.\(^{12}\) DHS recognizes these challenges, and has articulated initial steps toward addressing these specific challenges in Appendix C of this report. DHS will provide recommendations on how the NCPS and Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) programs can be updated to enable a layered security architecture that facilitates transition to modern computing in the commercial cloud.

Next steps to support this recommendation are as follows:

**Immediate Action:**

It is recommended that the President direct the implementation of the plan outlined below to accelerate secure use of commercial cloud through the modernization of the NCPS Program and TIC capabilities, policies, reference architectures, and associated cloud security authorization baselines. This effort will support the prioritization of security resources from lower-value assets to higher-value assets, enabling agencies to build out data-level protections in furtherance of a layered security architecture, and directly accelerating commercial cloud adoption. This effort will be driven by agency use cases, which will also be used to inform rapid updates to policy. This modernization effort will prioritize work to focus on cloud-ready projects and target agencies struggling to comply with the TIC policy and cloud adoption efforts to provide more immediate relief. The goal is to accelerate migration on three cloud-ready systems within the next year. OMB will codify this plan in an initial update to TIC policy, to provide agencies clear direction on the path forward. The

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\(^{10}\) See Footnote 9.


entire process described below will be overseen directly by the ATC, including weekly status updates to the Director of the ATC regarding progress.

Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 30 Days:

Pursuant to its statutory authorities and in execution thereof, OMB will submit a data call to agencies requesting submission of both in-progress and pending projects for cloud migration. Agencies should focus submissions on projects that have experienced delays due to constraints in current TIC policy and NCPS program implementation, and should propose a migration plan that highlights needed changes to requisite policies and capabilities to facilitate faster migration.

Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 60 Days:

The ATC, supported by GSA, will include the FedRAMP PMO and the Technology Transformation Service (TTS), DHS, OMB to include USDS, NSC, and other relevant parties will review these submissions and bucket them into three categories:

1. Systems that are sufficiently low risk to migrate to cloud immediately. These systems will be migrated to the cloud, and lessons learned will be captured and used to pilot further changes to existing policy. These systems will also be the focus of additional updates to the FedRAMP baselines to explore further tailoring of controls for low-risk systems.\(^{13}\)

2. Systems that are high-priority cloud migration candidates but present a level of risk significant enough that external assistance is necessary to ensure secure migration. This will represent a small number of “implementation validation case studies” that will receive technical assistance in support of their migrations. Lessons learned from these case studies will be used to inform new approaches to TIC and NCPS policy and operations.

3. Systems that are such high risk that they should not be migrated until further policy direction is given or capability enhancements are made. These systems will be assessed to evaluate whether there are common features or capabilities that could be provided efficiently, effectively, and securely by cloud service providers (CSPs). This analysis will serve as an input to the FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB) prioritization of high-baseline CSP offerings available to agencies wanting to migrate high impact data to the cloud.

To codify this approach, OMB will provide a preliminary update to the TIC policy that introduces a 90 day sprint during which projects approved by OMB will pilot proposed changes in TIC requirements and formalizes the approach outlined above and in the subsequent two sections.

Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 90 Days:

1. For Category 1 of projects above, agencies will be given approval to begin cloud migration by following their proposed migration plans. GSA, DHS, OMB, and NSC will require collection of metrics, which will be used to ensure that the proposed changes to policy, that do not introduce an unacceptable level of cybersecurity risk. Agency project

\(^{13}\) This approach was originally piloted by the FedRAMP Tailored baseline, which was designed to increase FedRAMP’s flexibility to rapidly authorize and use low-risk applications. The deadline for public comment on this initial tailored baseline was in July 2017.
teams would capture these metrics and lessons learned from these migrations and submit initial findings to GSA, DHS, and OMB. These inputs will inform changes to the TIC policy, Reference Architecture (RA), and NCPS operational model and outcomes and to further tailoring of the FedRAMP baselines. These activities will be undertaken within the understanding that agency heads still own the risk for the system authorizations and control decisions they are making.

2. For category 2 projects above, GSA, DHS, OMB, NSC, USDS, and other relevant parties will kick off a 90-day sprint to validate particular case studies. The exact number of engagements will be driven by staffing considerations from these organizations, but will consist of at minimum three test cases. These case studies will be operational in nature, and will validate a subset of implementation plans for improving the TIC policy, RA, and NCPS operational model and outcomes in commercial cloud.

3. For category 3 projects above, GSA, DHS, and OMB will work with agencies to evaluate whether there are common features or capabilities that could be provided efficiently, effectively, and securely by CSPs. This analysis will serve as an input to the FedRAMP JAB’s prioritization of high-baseline CSP offerings available to agencies wanting to migrate high-impact data to the cloud.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 180 Days:**

DHS, GSA, and OMB will use the information gathered from the activities listed in the section immediately preceding to inform rapid updates to the TIC policy, reference architectures (RA), and NCPS operational models to facilitate outcomes in commercial cloud. The updates will codify the findings from these case studies, as well as holistically address incentives and barriers for agencies in securely migrating to commercial cloud solutions. This update would at a minimum address the following issue areas:

- A recommendation as to whether (1) “all information” traveling to and from agency information systems hosted by commercial cloud providers warrants scanning by DHS through NCPS; (2) which NCPS capabilities are most applicable in commercial cloud environments of differing asset value; and (3) what new NCPS capabilities may be required to maximize effectiveness in a commercial cloud environment;
- How the current NCPS model could be adapted to accommodate a larger number of access points per agency, including any number of virtualized access points for agencies who are migrating their services to cloud environments;
- Requirements to enable lifting the constraint of two TIC Access Points per agency with assurance that consistent configuration management is applied, information is shared, and new updates are deployed rapidly;
- How agencies can best incorporate intrusion detection and prevention capabilities into their use of cloud services in a way that ensures adequate visibility to agency operators and helps DHS to protect Federal information. Updates to the capabilities outlined in applicable OMB Memoranda and DHS’s TIC RA to revisit the critical capabilities for boundary protection, de-emphasize the prescribed architectural implementation, and focus on capabilities, especially those that serve as compensating controls for commercial cloud environments;
- Which TIC capabilities, if any, are appropriate for traffic associated with systems protecting FISMA-Low data, or any lower impact data as aligned with the tasking for Commerce’s proposed revisions to FIPS Publication 199 and 200;
- The impact of allowing traffic associated with systems deployed to commercial cloud to not employ physical TIC protection if those systems meet the appropriate operational security capabilities for cloud described in the updated RA;
- Best practices agencies should follow in implementing protections at other levels beyond the network, including how these practices should be integrated with the agencies’ network security program;
- Elimination of the existing TIC-related FISMA metrics and manual TIC Compliance Validation (TCV) process, replacing both with automated metric collection, to the extent possible, with a primary focus on both security and availability measures. This should leverage, to the extent possible, existing capabilities under the CDM program and build on previous research DHS has undertaken to automate TIC compliance using this program; and
- Options for the reallocation, if necessary, of current TIC-related DHS personnel and resources toward helping agencies resolve operational issues in cloud migration.

3. Consolidate Network Acquisitions and Management

The current model of IT acquisition wherein each agency, and often multiple components within a single agency, purchase goods and services independently has contributed to a fractured IT landscape. This creates an inconsistent security posture and fails to maximize the buying power of the Federal Government. To alleviate this problem, the Federal Government is implementing category management principles to consolidate and standardize network and security service acquisitions to take full advantage of economies of scale, reduce burden, and dramatically improve technical development and operations.

Currently, GSA is transitioning agencies from the legacy Networx contract, under which agencies purchased $1.79 billion in network and telecommunications services in fiscal year (FY) 2016, to a comprehensive solution-based contract vehicle called Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions (EIS).\(^{14}\) The purpose of EIS is to address all aspects of agency telecommunications and network infrastructure requirements while also leveraging the bulk purchasing power of the Federal Government. EIS can be leveraged to help address some of the unique challenges faced by small agencies, a community that typically lags behind the large agencies in terms of cybersecurity capabilities.\(^{15}\) Smaller and non-CFO Act agencies struggle to attract and retain top information security personnel and often lack the expertise to fully manage their information security programs. This impedes the Federal Government’s ability to gain a full understanding of the risk to Federal networks. EIS can be leveraged to consolidate acquisition activities and other security services for small agency networks by focusing on the objectives below.

**Reduce Wasteful Spending on Duplicative Security Capabilities.** Under the current Networx contract, agencies who do not have their own TIC capabilities must procure TIC services by purchasing the full suite of Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Services (MTIPS)

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\(^{14}\) The recently rescinded OMB Memorandum M-08-26, *Transition from FTS 2001 to Networx* stated that all agencies should use Networx to acquire telecommunications connectivity, including the option to purchase Trusted Internet Connections solutions from vendors as a managed service, called Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Services (MTIPS). As of July 2017, an OMB Memorandum mandating a similar use under the EIS contract does not exist.

\(^{15}\) In this report, “large” agencies refer to the 24 agencies required to appoint agency Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) (i.e., “CFO Act agencies”) under the *Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990* (31 U.S.C. §901). All other agencies aside from these 24 are referred to as “small” agencies.
services,\textsuperscript{16} the bundling of which prohibits agencies from procuring only those tools they need, thereby increasing cost. EIS will allow agencies the flexibility to choose \textit{a la carte} the managed security services tools they need to comply with MTIPS requirements, while still being protected by the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities DHS provides.\textsuperscript{17} Though a positive and cost-saving step for many agencies, some small agencies may still struggle to procure TIC-like capabilities in this manner due to the complexity of managing the procurement and integration of multiple vendors; however, when paired with the proposed revisions to the existing TIC policy and RA, agencies will be able to make cost-effective acquisition decisions based on their existing tools and overall risk tolerance.

\textbf{Decrease Risk by Improving Situational Awareness of Managed External Network Connections to the Internet.} Approximately 40 of the 102 small agencies supported by the Networx contract currently receive MTIPS services. The result of this gap in MTIPS capabilities is a lack of shared situational awareness regarding the network traffic traversing Federal network boundaries. This lack of awareness makes it difficult to conduct enhanced monitoring of network traffic and ultimately makes it harder to perform incident response activities. Increasing this visibility is critical to the defense of the .gov environment, and the additional flexibilities noted above will enable the remaining agencies to provide the requisite information.

Next steps to support the objectives outlined above are as follows:

\textbf{Immediate Action:}

It is recommended that the President direct implementation of the plan outlined below. This plan will leverage the consolidated buying power of the Federal Government to procure more cost effective and secure network services.

\textbf{Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 60 Days:}

DHS to provide GSA and agencies with baseline configuration guidance for Managed Security Services (MSS) capabilities offered under EIS in order to maximize the return on investment for the security capabilities procured by agencies and to ensure compliance with current TIC policy.

\textbf{Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 90 Days:}

GSA, in coordination with DHS, shall develop a comprehensive acquisition strategy that provides a feasibility assessment and roadmap to accomplish the following tasks:

- Provide a path for all small agencies to more easily and cost effectively utilize EIS services. This strategy should ensure the Federal Government is maximizing its buying power when competing contracts under EIS;
- Review current security capabilities currently offered under MTIPS, as defined by the TIC RA, to ensure the capabilities provide adequate security within the current threat environment, and determine if any security capabilities need to be added or removed from the existing MTIPS baseline. This should include an examination, including cost

\textsuperscript{16} MTIPS providers supply small agencies with a vendor-managed solution that ensures compliance with OMB's Trusted Internet Connection policy.

\textsuperscript{17} Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 151.
analysis, of the feasibility of providing a service consisting only of traffic aggregation in order to decrease the cost burden on small agencies;

- Identify additional areas of opportunity outside of EIS to consolidate acquisition of cybersecurity services and products; and
- Determine the feasibility of establishing a centralized acquisition support function within GSA that is capable of performing cybersecurity-related contract management activities for small agencies.

**Other High-Level Actions:**

**Increase Economies of Scale through Consolidation of Contracts for Small Agencies.** Currently, 102 Federal small agencies are supported by the legacy Networx contract, each on separate task orders. GSA will support these small agencies in the transition to EIS by consolidating requirements for small agencies and is considering the best approach to leverage a limited number of task orders to purchase the majority of services these agencies need. Through the consolidation of common requirements across small agencies, GSA can leverage one or a small number of task orders under EIS to purchase the majority of services needed for all small agencies, with an option to provide additional specific language focused on agency-specific requirements, in order to realize economies of scale.

**Improve Acquisitions Support for Small Agencies to Maximize the Use of MTIPS and other Cybersecurity Services.** For small agencies, there are often barriers to acquiring and maximizing the benefits of MTIPS. In addition to high costs, many small agencies lack the appropriate expertise to draft effective task orders and the resources to manage their MTIPS contract and hold vendors accountable for accomplishing the work specified in Service Level Agreements (SLAs). As such, GSA will provide guidance to small agencies on how best to leverage its cross-agency acquisition in order to optimize their IT investments and management throughout the procurement process.
Shared Services to Enable Future Network Architectures

Summary of Efforts to Date

A model for sharing services already exists within the Federal Government, allowing for the delivery of common administrative functions such as financial management, human resources, payroll, and acquisitions. The concept of shared services was first substantively addressed by the Federal Government in the early 1980s with the creation of the National Finance Center within the Department of Agriculture, which sought to reduce redundancy in the hiring of administrative staff. The value of sharing was self-evident, and, in the 1990s, a series of projects to share back-office services were established and made permanent. In addition, the Federal Government began laying the foundation to implement category management principles by establishing a team of dedicated senior Government executives to oversee the 10 largest areas of federal procurement. Specifically, the IT Category Manager established several interagency subcategory teams to further streamline and management of common IT commodities such as hardware, software, and mobility.

While there has long been interest in shared services for general IT needs, a perilous threat environment has resulted in a need for cybersecurity shared services as well as commercially provided capabilities, such as email and cloud. Not only would the widespread use and deployment of shared services in information security provide cost savings, they would also provide a more consistent level of security across the Federal enterprise.

Current State

Addressing security challenges is critical if the Federal Government expects to achieve strong security outcomes; however, the current model of distributed Federal IT makes tackling complex resource-intensive problems in a consistent manner challenging. Today, each agency must independently identify possible vendors, evaluate the security of the vendors, issue an ATO, integrate the solution into their own independent bespoke IT infrastructure, and allocate resources to monitor and operate that infrastructure on an ongoing basis. The combination of these factors does not achieve consistent high quality security outcomes.

The Federal Government is the world’s largest buyer. There is a critical need to change the way the Federal Government buys common information technology products and services. Significant contract duplication means that agencies award multiple contracts for similar goods and services, often leading to hundreds, if not thousands, of contracts for the same requirement with same vendors. Additionally, there are huge price variance for the exact same item, sometimes as much as 300 - 400 percent. Agencies work highly autonomously, with only occasional collaboration across organizations and little sharing of information, standards, and best practices. This degree of fragmentation, lack of common standards, and lack of coordination drives costly redundancies and inefficiencies in procurement actions, contracting vehicles, and customization of common information technology solutions.

The existing federated and distributed approach to IT is no longer sustainable in an increasingly mobile, cloud-based and complex digital world. Building or internally operating such security programs requires specialized cybersecurity talent and knowledge, access to a broad range of
data sources to manage the latest threats, and sophisticated and costly emulation and static analysis technology. This is an immense undertaking for large departments, but even more so for smaller and non-CFO Act agencies who often struggle with basic security functions, such as vulnerability mitigation, due to resource limitations. Programs like CDM are taking steps toward deploying common tools across all agencies and integrating large and small agencies into a shared cybersecurity understanding; however, many of these programs, including CDM, have been mired by delays and have not yet yielded their full promise.

**Future State & Objectives**

In order to reduce cost, improve operational efficiencies and cybersecurity, the Federal Government must shift toward a consolidated IT model. This includes adopting centralized offerings for non-mission specific functions by default, and should comprise commodity IT, such as email, productivity, collaboration, and security tools. This approach is consistent with ongoing category management practices and will help the Federal Government rapidly deploy new capabilities that will enhance agencies’ abilities to perform their missions and secure their networks. The Federal Government must embrace the broader use of cloud services while working to develop cloud products that meet Federal cybersecurity standards. With the proper type of cloud offering designed with an appropriate focus on security, the increased use and consolidation of IT services in multi-tenant cloud services can provide the visibility and control necessary to deploy data-level protections and automated cybersecurity outlined earlier in this report. Agencies must leverage shared services and embrace commercial technologies where possible, building new capabilities only when shared services and commercial technologies cannot meet mission need.

In order to achieve the desired future state, the Government must address the current impediments in policy, resource allocation, and disparate agency interpretations of statutes and guidance, in addition to other considerations that are obstacles to agencies' adopting shared and cloud services. The Government should work with cloud infrastructure providers to obtain systems that offer world-class levels of functionality, cost-effectiveness, and security based on the providers' abilities to aggregate demand across a broad range of customers. Rather than relying on often outdated and agency-specific systems, the Federal Government could leverage these providers' expertise to both save taxpayer dollars and increase effectiveness and security.

**Implementation Plan**

Both the short- and long-term steps outlined in this section will result in greater innovation across the Federal enterprise, decrease costs, and dramatically improve services provided to both agencies and citizens. These interventions will allow agencies, and particularly smaller agencies, to more easily acquire and adopt commodity cloud infrastructure products, while leveraging the Federal Government’s buying power to produce economies of scale. Additionally, these efforts will augment existing agency-specific technology to improve both visibility and security. This implementation plan focuses on three key areas viewed as pivotal for accelerating the move to shared services: (1) enabling the use of commercial cloud services and infrastructure; (2) accelerating adoption of cloud email and collaboration tools; and (3) providing additional and improving existing shared services.
1. Enable the Use of Commercial Cloud Services and Infrastructure

Major commercial cloud infrastructure providers offer excellent levels of functionality, cost effectiveness, and security because of their ability to aggregate demand across a broad range of customers. There are a wide range of ways each of the models outlined below can drive cloud adoption by Government customers; however, it is generally helpful to think about the options as one default approach and a second option when security requirements require it.

- "Bring the Government to the Cloud." This approach is the recommended default approach the Government should utilize and is characterized by multitenant commercially owned infrastructure (e.g., building servers, networks, applications) that is shared with other non-Government customers, but in which Government data is protected through security technologies and encryption.

- “Bring the Cloud to the Government.” This approach is characterized by multitenant Government-owned and -operated infrastructure (e.g., buildings, servers, networks, applications) or commercially owned and operated infrastructure isolated and dedicated for Government use.

In order to ensure a smooth adoption of cloud technologies across the Government, it is important to understand the various models that are available for utilizing cloud services. The following two options describe the main approaches in which the Government has adopted cloud services and how these models could be adjusted moving forward.

**Bring Government to the Cloud: Vendor-owned and -operated servers and applications — Software as a Service**

This is the ubiquitous public cloud model used by the vast majority of private sector cloud providers, and is already in use by many Federal agencies today. Among other uses, this model is appropriate for modern cloud-hosted email, productivity, and collaboration tools. Government agencies also currently use Software as a Service for a wide variety of applications like online payroll services, applicant tracking systems for hiring, and travel booking and expense management systems. These services are typically accessed through secure connections over the Internet.

Many agencies have already fully embraced vendor-operated, cloud-based collaboration tools, and, depending on the agency, may have anywhere from dozens to hundreds of such tools in use today in their environment. It is important for the rest of Government to migrate from legacy offerings to take advantage of the increased productivity and innovation that these shared services offer.

**Bring Government to the Cloud: Vendor-owned and operated servers and Government-operated applications with networks that utilize a secure connection — Infrastructure as a Service**

Some service needs can only be met by developing custom software, or by buying software not available as a service. With this model, a cloud vendor owns and operates servers in a private sector data center, but connected through a secure connection. Secure connections could include HTTPS, TLS, peering, etc. This provides an infrastructure upon which agencies deploy applications that they create or acquire. This model can be utilized for secure, critical applications that are only available to Government users on a virtual private network (VPN) or other network-level isolation.
Because Infrastructure as a Service gives customers control over many low-level details, it can entirely replace the need for a traditional on premise data center. Agencies can often move existing services from legacy on premise data centers to cloud infrastructure with some software modifications.

These applications can be public services used by the general public or private internal services used by agency employees. In either case, agencies may consider cloud infrastructure as a service to be an extension of their existing private enterprise network, or they may treat it as a separate, isolated network. Regardless, users access the service through secure connections, which could include HTTPS, TLS, VPN, or a dedicated line.

Infrastructure as a service excels at providing a platform for creating and deploying the digital services that are core to an agency’s mission. These models are already in use by agencies in a wide range of use cases, including benefits processing for veterans, immigration, and healthcare, as well as data processing and software testing in the Department of Defense community.

**Bring the Cloud to Government: Government-owned data center buildings with vendor-owned and -operated services**

For certain applications where using the Internet is not a viable option, commercial providers can operate infrastructure in Government-owned facilities. This is attractive for classified systems, which cannot be connected to the public Internet. For example, the intelligence community was the original adopter of a model in which vendor-owned and operated services were based out of Government-owned data center buildings. An example of this approach is the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE) Commercial Cloud Services.

This model is much more expensive than fully commercial cloud services, and cannot keep pace with the innovation of public cloud solutions. As such, it is only appropriate where the Government absolutely must retain physical control over the infrastructure.

It is important to be wary of on premise solutions that are sold with cloud terminology that do not actually meet the NIST Essential Characteristics of cloud computing.\(^\text{18}\) Often, products that claim to offer private cloud infrastructure fail to deliver on these promises, missing key aspects such as rapid elasticity, on-demand self-service, or resource pooling.

**Bring the Cloud to Government: Vendor-owned and -operated data centers with servers dedicated for Government use**

Many cloud service providers offer Government-dedicated versions of their services, where the provider builds segregated space for Government use so that agency customers only share logical space (possibly including servers, buildings, networks, personnel) with other Government customers. This allows a provider to more easily meet Government-specific compliance requirements for securing sensitive data.

\(^{18}\) NIST SP 800-145, *The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing.*
This model provides a middle ground between public shared cloud infrastructure and costly on-premise infrastructure. It is used by many agencies today to house applications where legal, compliance, or security reasons preclude the use of shared servers.

This model, which is already in use, could be particularly useful and appropriate for hosting Government websites and services for infrastructure that may have sensitivities for which public servers would not be appropriate.

**Recommendations:**

Cloud is not a one-size-fits-all solution, and offers a multitude of options for agencies based on their needs and preferences. While it is important to ensure flexibility across the Federal Government, there are a few models that can cover the majority of Federal use cases. As such, the Government should invest in two to three cloud models to support the differing security and risk-tolerance postures of agencies.

In particular, the Government should expand its use of the “Bring the Government to the Cloud” models, as these best balance the benefits of cloud computing—including improved performance and cost-savings—with outsourced security and control. While the impending revisions to the TIC policy and guidance will affect some of the eventual business decisions surrounding cloud options, agencies should begin working to determine how best to use the models outlined above.

Next steps to support the above recommendations are as follows:

**Upon Approval of the President and Within a Timeline of 30 Days:**

Pursuant to its statutory authorities and in execution thereof, OMB will conduct a data call requesting that agencies identify systems that may be ready for cloud migration and can be migrated securely but have not yet migrated due to perceived or encountered difficulties. At the conclusion of this data call, OMB and GSA will review the impediments to moving to the cloud outlined by agencies and will prioritize an infusion of technical talent, capital, and updated security policy (developed iteratively to solve agency-specific issues) as needed to enable prioritized cloud migrations. This task is described in more detail in the following section.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 120 Days:**

Pursuant to its statutory authorities and in execution thereof, OMB, in coordination with DHS, GSA, and its Federal partners, will update the Federal Cloud Computing Strategy (“Cloud-First”). This strategy will provide additional guidance to agencies on the most impactful use cases for cloud adoption and how best to conduct appropriate operational security in cloud environments. This effort will be informed by the OMB-led efforts with the ATC work regarding reducing the time and complexity of ATOs, including ATOs specific to cloud infrastructure and platforms.

OMB, working with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Council, GSA, and DHS will develop clauses that define consistent requirements for security, privacy, and access to data for use in cloud contracts. These clauses will ensure uniformity in contract language and provide rigor to standard Government terms, which would be particularly valuable to

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agencies lacking relevant technical, legal, or acquisitions expertise to craft, out of whole cloth, such language in their cloud procurements.

2. Accelerate Adoption of Cloud Email and Collaboration Tools

Email is an essential mechanism for collaboration and one of the most prevalent attack vectors for cybercrime in modern society. Targeted, email-based spear phishing attacks using malicious attachments and links are the primary attack vector for compromising individuals and organizations.

Accelerated rollout of cloud email and collaboration is urgent given the number of duplicative legacy systems and their associated cybersecurity risks. In addition, even within cloud-based email, there exists price variance due to the fact that agencies negotiate individually. Thus, consolidating buying power through Government-wide price negotiations has the potential to achieve further cost savings.

In order to support agencies in moving away from their own email servers and solutions, a set of secure, easy-to-maintain, and cost-effective solutions must be available. Industry is well positioned to provide effective security controls, especially when paired with NCPS capabilities and to enable agencies to leverage improved mobile, tablet, and productivity improvements. There are currently only two hosted solutions deployed in the Federal Government, though additional competitors could emerge. Regardless, a requirement to make better use of cloud-based email and collaboration services increases the Government’s leverage in obtaining better pricing.

While the benefits are worthwhile, ranging from cost savings to improved security, the migration itself to cloud-based tools can be costly and burdensome, particularly for smaller agencies. In order to support agencies in their migration, a set of secure, easy-to-maintain, and cost-effective solutions must be made available.

The Government must pursue new acquisition tactics for cloud email and collaboration licenses. In furtherance of this objective, pilots such as the example outlined in Appendix D may be executed to decrease the administrative acquisition burden, specifically for smaller agencies who cannot leverage large volume discounts or who have acquisition workforce constraints. Additional pilots may include the ability to purchase cloud services on a consumption basis and coordinated purchasing to obtain tiered-based pricing.

Successful execution of the pilot outlined in Appendix D will result in agreements with cloud email providers, which define volume discount pricing based on the total number of Government-wide mailboxes to be migrated while preserving the ability for agencies to compete with cloud email providers. This pilot will help determine what, if any, drawbacks or complications emerge from the creation of this heretofore untested model of volume pricing negotiations. This should result in shorter competitions (one to two months for acquiring cloud email licenses) as opposed to the months- to years-long process such procurements, such as establishing Government-wide acquisition contracts or blanket purchase agreements, currently require.

One of the fundamental advantages the Government has in seeking products and services is that its size should allow it to leverage competing market forces to drive Government-wide volume pricing and increase the overall speed of migration. The goal would be to incentivize providers
through tiered pricing agreements that would produce publicly displayed price points to serve as the base license price for any licenses purchased by the Government.

This would mark a significant departure from existing acquisition marketplaces where existing models are laborious for both Government and industry and fail to truly capture volume spending as an aggregated value. In addition, the current process does not always offer sufficient transparency, allowing some agencies to pay less than others. Often, it is the small agencies, who can least afford higher prices, that are penalized.

Next steps to support the above recommendations are as follows:

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 30 Days:**

OMB will conduct a data call to agencies regarding their current email contracts, prices, and number of mailboxes. It is imperative that the Government obtain an accurate measurement of the market size of agencies who have not yet migrated to cloud email. While there are clear data on the current need among CFO Act agencies, there is currently no definitive data regarding the adoption of cloud-based email solutions at small and independent agencies. Understanding the full size of the marketplace will enable the Government to maximize its leverage in negotiations with cloud collaboration vendors.

OMB will convene a task force of agencies to finalize a standard set of requirements for cloud email, including both low and moderate security postures for email and cloud collaboration. These requirements, which will build upon previously completed work, will be circulated to all agencies for comment and serve as the basis for acquisition.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 45 Days:**

OMB will issue updated identity policy guidance for public comment that will reduce agency burden and recommend identity service areas suitable for shared services. GSA will provide a business case to the Federal CIO on the consolidation of existing identity services to improve usability and drive secure access and interoperability. This action will enable secure access and collaboration as a service in a way that improves existing agency-specific implementations, which often have various levels of security and do not include interoperability.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 60 Days:**

OMB will establish a comprehensive strategy for driving the accelerated migration of agency email and collaboration tools to the cloud for departments and agencies who have still not adopted cloud-based email. This strategy should emphasize achieving both cost savings and improved security.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 90 Days:**

OMB will assemble an Acquisition Tiger Team (ATT), which will be charged with drafting and disseminating a “quick start” acquisition package that can help agencies facilitate rapid license and migration service acquisitions. This will make it possible for agencies to award licenses and services that may presently have difficulty doing so. The “quick start” package would include market research, acquisition plans, templates for requesting quotes, identified
sources of supply, and Independent Government Cost Estimate calculation templates (based on already completed acquisitions).

The ATT, working through the appropriate executive agent, will send out Requests for Information (RFIs) or conduct other market research activities to find qualified small business and socio-economic concerns to leverage set aside programs and other authorities to streamline the migration acquisitions to the greatest extent possible. For example, using the 8(a) Digital Service Initiative or vehicles that have resulted from Category Management efforts in this space.\(^\text{20}\)

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 180 Days:**

The Government should consider incentives for early adoption (migration in the first year following the formalization of the effort), including individualized assistance tailored to a given agency’s needs. To assist in such an effort, OMB will create acquisition/migration cadres, consisting of information technology and acquisition specialists that will be sent to early adopter agencies to help with license and migration acquisitions-related challenges. Initially, these cadres would draw from agencies that have already completed their migrations, such as the Department of the Justice (DOJ) and acquisition experts from the Digital IT Acquisition Professional Training (DITAP) alumni network.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 240 Days:**

OMB, with support from GSA, will pilot new acquisition tactics for cloud email and collaboration licenses including but not limited to those discussed above and outlined in Appendix D.

**Other High-Level Actions:**

Approved FISMA-Moderate cloud based collaboration tools currently exist. GSA will continue to work with existing cloud email and collaboration providers, and will prioritize approval of a FISMA-High offering. Process improvements will continue iteratively to enable agencies to accelerate adoption of cloud services.

3. **Improve Existing and Provide Additional Security Shared Services**

As cyberattacks have become more sophisticated, frequent, and easier for adversaries to execute, cybersecurity has continued to escalate as a primary responsibility for all individual agencies and for the Federal Government as a whole. Addressing cybersecurity threats holistically necessitates both a further consolidation of the Federal Government’s IT footprint as well as an expansion of shared, centralized services to better leverage Federal buying power, standardize security capabilities, improve the time it takes to detect and respond to incidents, and realize economies of scale from aggregating data.

\(^{20}\) TechFAR Hub, 8(a) Program Digital Service Initiative.
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)

DHS established the CDM Program in 2013 to provide Federal civilian agencies with automated continuous monitoring tools to detect vulnerabilities and potentially malicious network activity in near real-time.\textsuperscript{21, 22} CDM Phase 1, which is currently being deployed, is designed to determine “what is on the network” by providing agencies with capabilities to identify and remediate vulnerabilities and ensure secure hardware and software configurations on their networks. CDM Phase 2 will focus on “who is on the network” and provide capabilities to detect and manage privileged user access and ensure that only authorized, credentialed users have access to information on the network. CDM Phase 3 will report “what is happening on the network” and provide capabilities to identify and assess anomalies that may indicate a cybersecurity compromise and to implement ongoing assessment and authorization. CDM Phase 4 will focus on expanding data protections for Government information. All CDM capabilities will feed information to both an agency- and Federal-level dashboard, enabling Government-wide visibility into the current state of Federal information security.

Up to this point, CDM has not sought to address cloud-hosted systems and has instead focused on helping agencies secure their on premise networks. While this does introduce some limitations, the program has nonetheless elevated the baseline of cybersecurity across the Government. Over the identified phases, the program will deliver capabilities through various mechanisms, including an “as-a-service model,” to ensure that additional capabilities can be provided in a more centralized and standard way.

A challenge in implementing CDM capabilities in a more cloud-friendly architecture is that security teams and security operations centers may not necessarily have the expertise available to defend the updated architecture. To support agency cybersecurity efforts, the Federal Government is working to develop this expertise and provide it across agencies through CDM. Currently, all CFO Act agencies (except the Department of Defense) participate in CDM, as do 44 of non-CFO Act agencies in the Federal enterprise. CDM will continue to grow and provide sophisticated tools and services to current agencies, while working to onboard the other small agencies not currently served by the program.

This is imperative for enabling the Federal Government to increase security throughout the Federal enterprise. Further targeted actions by DHS’s CDM Program Office and agencies can help expedite the modernization and adoption of CDM to identify, detect, and respond to threats in the Federal Government’s increasing move to cloud environments and mobile devices.

\textbf{Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 60 Days:}

DHS, in partnership with agencies and GSA, will complete the acquisition strategy for new, long-term task orders to offer CDM lifecycle support to agencies and provide solution development and implementation for Phases 3 and 4 in addition to future work, including cloud security.

\textbf{Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 125 Days:}

DHS will obtain FedRAMP assistance in developing a DHS ATO package compliant with the FedRAMP process. Upon completion of the authorization process, DHS will begin on-

\textsuperscript{21} OMB Memorandum M-14-03, \textit{Enhancing the Security of Federal Information and Information Systems}.

\textsuperscript{22} Coordination of Federal Information Policy – Information Security (44 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(6)).
boarding agencies onto the CDM Shared Service Platform (SSP) to provide continuous monitoring as a service capabilities.

At the end of the 125 days, DHS will update OMB on the current number and status of remaining Memoranda of Agreement it has established with non-CFO Act agencies (above and beyond the current number of 44). DHS will also submit a plan to OMB that details the expectations and timelines for onboarding non-CFO Act agencies to the SSP.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 150 Days:**

DHS will complete the data exchanges between the agency- and Federal-level dashboards to provide enterprise-wide situational awareness of an agency’s cyber posture.

**Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 180 Days:**

DHS, in partnership with the Federal CIO Council, will implement a concept of operations for the Federal dashboard to include procedures to manage cyber risks across the Federal enterprise, and other factors pertinent to the broader Federal CIO community.

### Security Operations Center (SOC) as a Service

The Security Operations Center (SOC), which generally provides central visibility into the state of security on an agency’s networks, is an essential component of securing the Federal IT enterprise; however, many agencies lack the resources or expertise to establish their own agency-level SOCs. Given the vulnerability this creates, the establishment of a SOC as a service (SOCaaS) capability is essential to ensure appropriate enterprise-wide visibility, incident discovery, and information sharing among Federal agencies. Such a capability would allow agencies currently lacking such capabilities to purchase them from those agencies with sufficient capacity to offer such a service. This could allow for the creation of specialized offerings. For instance, agencies who have demonstrated expertise in defending cloud applications could expand their current SOC capabilities and offer a SOCAaaS, focusing specifically on cloud applications. In addition, contracts can be let with commercial providers to provide SOCAaaS offerings. Agencies lacking the requisite expertise could leverage these services to accelerate their migration to commercial cloud capabilities.

Over time, agencies offering SOCAaaS could provide a full suite of capabilities to agencies that do not want or need to manage their own operations. This would align with the consolidation of existing networks. A more consolidated SOC would have broader visibility, easier communications, and the ability to add tools not available in a more distributed model.

Specifically, SOC as a Service capabilities could:

- Prevent security capabilities from causing latency issues;
- Apply security protections at the application and data levels which are commensurate with the sensitivity of the data;
- Offer capabilities for multiple types of logs or data flows depending on cloud provider technology and contract specifications; and
- Allow visibility across multiple agency cloud systems to be aggregated and managed centrally.
Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 60 Days:

OMB, in coordination with DHS, will select agencies to provide SOC as a Service offerings for use across the Federal Government. GSA, in coordination with OMB and DHS, will lead contracting efforts to offer commercially provided SOC as a Service for use across the Federal Government.

Upon Approval of the President and within a Timeline of 90 Days:

Selected agencies will develop a pricing model in alignment with the cloud migration strategy and timeline outlined above.

Other High-Level Actions:

DHS will work with SOC as a Service providers to ensure that NCPS and CDM capabilities and outcomes can be achieved and that the visibility remains aggregated across cloud and on premise security capabilities. Additionally, selected agencies will create a pilot regarding their SOCaaS capability and identify initial agencies with whom they will collaborate to test access and visibility.
Conclusions & Summary of Requests for Engagement

Difficulties in agency prioritization of resources in support of IT modernization, ability to procure services quickly, and technical issues has resulted in an unwieldy and out-of-date Federal IT infrastructure incapable of operating with the agility and security that is required of a multibillion-dollar Federal IT enterprise. In order to aggressively modernize IT systems, the Federal Government will need to maximize use of shared services and commercial capabilities. In furtherance of this objective, existing policies and programs will be rapidly and iteratively updated to eliminate barriers to cloud adoption, and agencies will rapidly migrate applicable capabilities to commercial cloud services. Capabilities which will not be hosted in the commercial cloud will be modernized to leverage modern security protections, and agencies will assess risk of existing capabilities to prioritize resources on protecting the most important systems and information. The Federal Government will also accelerate the adoption of cloud email and collaboration tools, improve existing shared services, and provide additional security shared services for agencies.

Achieving these goals will require a shift in the mindset of agency leadership, mission owners, IT practitioners, and oversight bodies. Federal agencies must consolidate their IT investments and place more trust in services and infrastructure operated by others. Such a change in outlook will allow for greater utilization of shared services, consolidated infrastructure, and cloud-based collaboration tools that can deliver improved functionality and drive cost efficiencies to improve Government operations and citizen services.
Appendix A: Data-Level Protections and Modernization of Federal IT

The provision of appropriate protections begins with ensuring that foundational information security capabilities are in place. These capabilities should be implemented for all Federal IT systems; and any IT Modernization efforts should leverage the below principles as a core component of their upgrades. As agencies look to prioritize their modernization efforts, they are encouraged to focus first on deployment of these principles for high value assets.

High value assets (HVAs) are assets, Federal information systems, and data, for which the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction could cause a significant impact to the United States' national security interests, foreign relations, economy, or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people. This definition is codified in OMB Memorandum M-17-09, Management of Federal High Value Assets. As such, the protection of HVAs should be among the highest priority cybersecurity activities for Federal agencies.

Foundational Capabilities

**Multi-Factor Authentication.** The goal of multi-factor authentication is to make remote attacks unattractive, typically by requiring the production of a credential that is specifically connected to a user in a physical manner in order to grant the user access to a system. Recent Federal efforts have focused on multi-factor authentication for privileged users, or those with elevated access privileges, but thus far has largely centered on network access rather than system and application-level access.

**Least Privilege.** The principle of least privilege states that users should only be granted access to the specific systems and information they need in order to execute their official duties. In practice, this is achieved by limiting administrative privileges. Mature privilege management programs may also be able to leverage policy- or attribute-based access controls, wherein sophisticated rules-based policies (which can be dynamically updated and enforced) can support a system that makes privilege escalation more expensive and difficult for an attacker.

**Timely Patching.** One of the most significant threats to IT systems remains unpatched software vulnerabilities. For that reason, OMB, under OMB Memorandum M-15-01, Fiscal Year 2014-2015 Guidance on Improving Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Practices, required agencies to sign memorandums of agreement or understanding to allow the DHS to scan their external-facing systems for unpatched vulnerabilities. Under Binding Operational Directive 15-01, DHS then required agencies to patch critical vulnerabilities within 30 days of being notified of such vulnerabilities. Agencies should prioritize the creation of routine, and ideally automated, patching processes for their HVAs that ensure that critical vulnerabilities are resolved much more rapidly than the required 30 days.
**Risk-Based Capabilities**

In addition to the above capabilities that all agencies are expected to adopt, there are numerous information security capabilities which agencies are advised to deploy pursuant to assessments of the risk posed to a certain system or set of information. In the context of HVAs, the systems and information are, by definition, highly sensitive and/or impactful. As such, agencies should seriously consider the value of these capabilities in terms of better defending their “crown jewels.”

**Encrypting Data at Rest.** Data at rest is data in a database or other storage areas, as opposed to in transit between systems. Encrypting that data makes it inaccessible should an attacker manage to make a physical copy of it. Effective encryption of data at rest requires sufficiently strong encryption keys with sufficient randomness in key generation.\(^{23}\)

**Encrypting Data in Transit.** Encrypting data as it transits from one device or system component to another protects data from modification or interception from an attacker with a network vantage point. Network routes that transit data between information system components, or between information systems and their users, should generally be treated as untrusted, even within agency-operated networks. In general, though particularly for HVAs, systems should rely only on protocols that can safely “fail closed,” or default to denying network access, under attack scenarios. Examples include Secure Shell (SSH) or Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).

**Secure Application Development.** Security must be a regular, ongoing part of the software development process, not simply a paperwork exercise completed prior to production deployment. Security teams should be integrated throughout the software development process, starting from its earliest stages. Such an approach can alleviate the characterization of security personnel as impediments, but, rather, as essential members of the larger development team.

**Security Testing.** Penetration testing, phishing tests, and database assessments should be incorporated into the testing regimen for agency HVAs. Agencies should establish a vulnerability disclosure policy for public-facing services so that security researchers and members of the public can report vulnerabilities they discover. Teams wishing to go further should consider running bug bounty programs, such as those run by the Department of Defense or GSA.\(^{24}\)

**Threat Modeling.** Engineering teams should use threat modeling to understand and drive improvements in the security of the HVA. Threat models help identify the most vulnerable parts of an application. This focuses resources in the areas where risk reduction is needed the most, and forms a cornerstone of implementing a risk-based practice of security like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

**Application Whitelisting.** The purpose of application whitelisting is to allow only approved applications and application components (libraries, configuration files, etc.) to run on a host according to a well-defined baseline, while preventing all other applications from running by default. When implemented, application whitelisting is an effective security technique that helps stop the execution of malicious malware and other unauthorized software.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{23}\) See NIST SP 800-133, *Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation.*


\(^{25}\) See NIST SP 800-167, *Guide to Application Whitelisting.*
Mobile Device Management. Mobile devices often need additional protection because their nature generally places them at higher exposure to threats than other devices typically used within Government facilities, such as desktops and laptops. When planning mobile device security policies and controls, agencies should assume that mobile devices will be acquired by malicious parties who will attempt to recover sensitive data either directly from the devices themselves or indirectly by using the devices to access the organization’s remote resources. Therefore, a layered mitigation strategy should be used that includes user authentication to the device, protection of data either through encryption or by not storing data on the device, and user training and awareness to reduce the frequency of insecure physical security practices. Additionally, agencies should plan their mobile device security on the assumption that unknown third-party mobile device applications downloadable by users should not be trusted. Risk from these applications can be reduced in several ways, such as prohibiting all installation of third-party applications, implementing whitelisting to allow installation of approved applications only, verifying that applications only receive the necessary permissions on the mobile device, or implementing a secure sandbox/secure container that isolates the organization’s data and applications from all other data and applications on the mobile device.26

Leveraging Modern Deployment Solutions

In addition to the solutions described above, agencies should consider how best to take advantage of protections afforded by modern deployment patterns (e.g. “DevOps”) and cloud-based architectures in the defense of their HVAs.

Automated Deployments. System deployments should be automated to the greatest extent possible, removing the potential for errors caused by breakdowns in internal processes. To support this, configuration and environmental details that support system deployment should be versioned and managed similarly to the software that comprises the system itself. This practice is necessary to achieve long-term consistency among critical system components, maintain adequate patching, and update velocity.

Immutable Deployments. By building on automation, production environments should be designed so that components are not modified in place subsequent to being deployed. Modification should be technically constrained wherever possible; for example, deployed servers should not allow remote logins. By taking advantage of virtualized infrastructure, new deployments can create brand new instances of deployed system software and supporting components, rather than updating the existing environment in place. This approach allows system owners to design their security architecture and monitoring to treat any in-place modification as a potential attack, and to use more comprehensive technical constraints on modification that remove opportunities for attackers to persist in a deployed environment.

Appendix B: Principles of Cloud-Oriented Security Protections

As noted in the report, the Federal Government has traditionally focused its Government-wide information security efforts on protecting network boundaries; however, instead of emphasizing physically consolidated security at the perimeter, such as in the current Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) model, a data-centric approach emphasizes placing protections closer to the services and information systems in which sensitive data is stored and accessed. This gives agencies flexibility in the approaches they choose. For modern services hosted in the cloud, agencies can place security protections directly in front of each service and allow direct connections from the public internet. For services hosted in legacy data centers, such capabilities may not be available, in which case the agency can still rely on perimeter security as they pursue options to modernize their system architecture.

There is no one right way for an agency to operationalize security protections in Cloud Service Providers (CSPs), and some features and approaches may need to be optimized for the particular cloud service provider in use. Agencies should ensure any CSP they choose meets the security capabilities outlined by FedRAMP. The approach in this appendix applies to cases wherein an agency is directly operationalizing software in a cloud-hosting environment. This does not apply to Software as a Service (SaaS) applications operated in full by vendors, as their security approaches will be vendor-specific.

Agencies could take the following approach to designing security protections in a cloud-based application stack:

- An agency could separate their security stack from their application stack within their cloud provider. In whatever way this separation occurs, agencies should maintain the principle that a compromise of the application being protected should not automatically lead to compromise of the security stack being used to protect that application and vice versa;
- Incoming traffic could be routed through the cloud provider’s commodity virtualized load balancers, used to obtain a carbon-copy of the data, to a set of virtual security appliances. These virtual security appliances would process incoming traffic “on path,” meaning that incoming requests are blocked on the ability of the security appliances to process them. Since putting any devices “on path” of existing traffic has significant reliability, security, and performance implications, the choice of security functions for this purpose must be warranted by the sensitivity of the application. Lower sensitivity applications likely warrant few, if any, “on path” request processing services;
- These virtual appliances could themselves implement most of the security functions described by existing TIC policy, including intrusion detection, filtering, and logging. Importantly, these virtual appliances must be horizontally scalable so that any number of instances can handle as much traffic as the service might receive; and
- After the traffic is processed by the virtual security appliances, it exits the segregated security zone. It is then sent to the application’s load balancer to be processed normally by the application.
An example diagram showing data-centric security in a cloud provider is shown in **Figure 1**.

![Diagram of data-centric security in a cloud provider](image)

**Figure 1**

This data-centric application security layer could be implemented directly by an application team, or it could be run by an agency as an internal shared service for all applications hosted within a particular cloud provider. It could also be possible for a sufficiently responsive agency team to provide this layer as a shared service to multiple agencies who utilize the same cloud provider.

To achieve centralized visibility for agency security teams, this data-centric application security layer should send logs and alerts in real time to centralized aggregation systems that process security information and events. These centralized aggregation systems could be co-located in the same cloud provider as the applications from which they are aggregating information. They could also aggregate logs and network flow information received from the cloud service provider itself. One operational approach for doing this is described in the Security Operations Center as a Service section of this report.

**Government-Wide Visibility and Classified Indicators**

Some Government-specific security functions, such as the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities of 6 U.S.C. § 151, currently offered as EINSTEIN, would not be automatically fulfilled by commodity solutions. Some needs, for example, can only be addressed with classified indicators. This produces a challenge for agencies, as these classified indicators can only be stored in data centers meeting very specific security requirements. For most systems, however, these Government-specific functions, such as EINSTEIN 1 and EINSTEIN 2, do not leverage classified indicators or need to be physically “on path” for network traffic and incoming requests. Instead, the virtual appliances in the data-centric security layer could create a copy of relevant traffic or logs and send a stream to a nearby location (perhaps operated by DHS as part of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities of 6 U.S.C. § 151) where these Government-specific security functions can be performed in the background. The original copy of the traffic continues to flow to the cloud provider unless, depending on the capability at issue, an alert is generated from the intrusion prevention system. This achieves visibility and detection of classified threats without sacrificing the major benefits of adopting modern cloud architectures. A diagram of how this may look is represented in Figure 2.
DHS should also consider evolving NCPS’s intrusion prevention capabilities program to include the ability to receive and act on additional application layer traffic. In its current form, EINSTEIN 3A does not process most web traffic, because it only examines email and domain name server.

The data-centric approach outlined above also allows a more nuanced approach to protection, allowing security teams to focus their efforts on the systems that need it most. For low-impact systems that only store public data, it is likely unnecessary to split off traffic for classified analysis. For high-sensitivity systems with very valuable private data, it may be useful to require more security measures, such as waiting for classified analysis to be complete before passing traffic along to the application.

**Proportionate Security**

While the protections described in this appendix can be useful to many applications, the Federal Government should focus its limited security resources on its highest-value assets. All security protections come with a cost: any security services “on path” can impact reliability and performance, add complexity to system operations, and could have vulnerabilities that would be used against the applications they are intended to defend. Even “off path” security services that do not process data in real time, such as classified indicators and services that provide Government-wide visibility, add complexity as well as oversight and compliance costs to system operation.
For the Government’s security protections to be most effective, they should be deployed on systems whose data is worth such a sustained and sophisticated defense, such as HVAs. Systems that contain information that would have a low impact if compromised should instead be optimized for agility and availability, thus freeing security resources for more sensitive systems. An isolated system with no sensitive information therefore might merit a more streamlined architecture. **Figure 3** shows how a low-security system may serve requests directly:
Appendix C: Challenges to Implementing Federal-Wide Perimeter-Based Security

Today, the Federal Government applies a defense-in-depth strategy to protect its systems that includes agency and DHS-provided protections at various levels. But, at the same time, Government-wide programs overly rely on a perimeter-based security model to protect the Government’s networks and information systems. This model, formalized in OMB Memorandum M-08-05, Implementation of Trusted Internet Connections (TIC), focuses on standardizing security at the network boundary through consolidation of external access points. Under this model, the Government has required agencies to reduce external connections, to a target of 50, and route their traffic through this limited number of secure gateways. These gateways apply common intrusion detection and prevention capabilities under DHS’s National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS). NCPS consists of three sensor capabilities (collectively referred to as EINSTEIN), as well as a set of analytic tools used by cyber analysts to find, identify and categorize cyber threat activity. 27

The NCPS sensor suite is deployed in three iterations: EINSTEIN 1 (E1), which captures and analyzes network flow information; EINSTEIN 2 (E2), which incorporates intrusion detection technology that scans the content of network communications to identify and alert to known indications of malicious activity; and EINSTEIN 3-Accelerated (E3A), which detects and blocks malicious activity through DNS sinkholing and email filtering.

This perimeter-based architecture has created several challenges, specifically regarding adoption of commercial cloud and mobile technologies. Additionally, signature-based detection and protections systems provide value, but are not enough to combat the full spectrum of advanced persistent threats that rapidly change attack vectors, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 28, 29 All of these challenges are acknowledged and understood by DHS, and efforts are underway to address these specific issues.

As an overarching effort, DHS has undertaken a cybersecurity architectural review of Federal, Civilian, and Executive Branch infrastructure to capture empirical data, which will be used to determine the efficacy of individual and collective groupings of capabilities against specific threats to that architecture. This data will then be used to guide the evolution of DHS cyber program capabilities, to include NCPS and the CDM program.

In addition to the holistic architecture review, DHS has continuously assessed its programs to determine if the program investments they are making are appropriate. As part of this continuous assessment, DHS has identified several challenges that must be addressed to improve and deliver value to its Federal Executive Branch stakeholder community. These challenges include:

1. Cloud Security and Situational Awareness
2. Encrypted Network Traffic
3. Overreliance on Static Signatures
4. Use and Value of Classified Indicators

27 See Footnote 9.
Cloud Security and Situational Awareness

Federal agencies have started to embrace the use of cloud services to include Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS), which has the promise to move much of the Federal Executive Branch’s computing and data to commercially available cloud environments, outside of traditional network boundaries. In doing so, the emphasis on protecting and monitoring perimeter connections of trusted networks at a limited number of physical TIC access points has introduced performance degradation. This has discouraged agencies from fully adopting cloud services, and undermines many of their key benefits such as reducing costs, flexibility, time-to-deploy, and availability and reliability. An example of a current network routing challenge for agencies that have adopted cloud services is an agency that has implemented a public-facing web service must route user traffic through a limited number of physical TIC access points for inspection, which in turn introduces latency. The diagram below illustrates how this approach is currently implemented, in a phenomenon known as “the network trombone,” which constrains the benefits of cloud services by forcing users to route traffic through a physical network location rather than being able to connect directly to the cloud service.

To address this situation, DHS has engaged with three large cloud service providers to determine how DHS may gain the insight and situational awareness from within the cloud that is similar to the information that is gained from its E1 and E2 sensors that are deployed at the TICs. The focus of this engagement thus far has been the collection of internal cloud log data, specific to the agency application and data that could be fed back to DHS to provide a similar level of situational awareness to DHS cyber analysts.
**Encrypted Network Traffic**

As the use of cloud and web services continues to expand, so has the use of network transport security in the form of encrypted tunnels between end users and their applications and data. The use of transport encryption is critical for secure communications, but limits what is visible to a perimeter-based monitoring system such as E1 or E2. The amount of network traffic that is encrypted that passes through E1 and E2 sensors has increased over time, with 47 percent of all traffic being encrypted as of December 2016. This continued growth of encrypted network traffic has limited the functionality and usefulness of E1 and E2 sensors and has made it difficult for DHS to inspect this traffic for cyber threats. For DHS E2 sensors, this means that DHS signatures are unable to inspect the content of network communications and alert on malicious content.

Continued growth in encryption is both beneficial and inevitable, and DHS has commissioned research to determine potential architectural, technical, and policy mitigation strategies that could provide DHS with both the protection and situational awareness for encrypted traffic. Some of the mitigation strategies currently under evaluation include:

1. **Sensor Placement.** This involves relocating the E1 and E2 sensors where the traffic is decrypted (e.g., endpoints of an encrypted tunnel). In the cases of virtual private network tunnels, one could place sensors outside of encrypted areas. For cloud environments, investigation is needed to determine how these sensors could be virtualized and placed in physical or virtual locations where Government applications and data exist.

2. **Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Interception.** This involves deploying MITM technologies that decrypt traffic, inspect it, and re-encrypt it, by placing a proxy along the network path. This proxy falsely pretends to each side to be the other side of the communications. Network proxies that intercept Transport Layer Security (TLS) traffic via MITM are commercially available. Usually this requires local clients to have blanket trust of this proxy.

3. **Key Escrow.** This involves gaining access to decryption keys (e.g., as part of a broader certificate management system and architecture). A key escrow approach requires clients to register keys with a trusted third party.

**Overreliance on Static Signatures**

The use of signatures, or software code that inspects network traffic to look for known content, ports, and protocols, has been a fundamental part of cybersecurity practice. Similar to how antivirus software works, intrusion detection and prevention technologies inspect traffic to look for matches against signatures of known malicious content or behavior. Although signature-based technology is widely accepted as an effective and necessary piece of cyber defense, it is not enough to protect against the most advanced and persistent threats facing the Government today. NCPS uses signatures within their E2 intrusion detection and E3A prevention capability areas. In recognition of the limitations of signature-only systems, DHS has been piloting an anomalous analytics capability that leverages artificial intelligence to detect malicious activity across networks that will allow DHS to both respond to previously unidentified incidents. DHS can then rapidly generate new signatures for both EINSTEIN sensors and agency defenses to protect the Government from those threats. DHS has seen some early success from this pilot
and is planning to build a production-grade system that could be deployed at various points across the .gov architecture, both inside and outside agency network and computing enclaves.

**Use and Value of Classified Indicators**

The use of signatures in intrusion detection and prevention systems are based on pieces of information known as cyber threat indicators. These “indicators” can be any piece of observable information about the network traffic such as an Internet Protocol (IP) address, domain name, or file hash, that may indicate whether the traffic entering or exiting a network may be suspicious or malicious. DHS sources its indicators from multiple sources to include in-house analysis of Government traffic, commercial and open-source cyber threat data, and the intelligence community. Although all of the signatures within the E2 system are unclassified, significant portions of the signatures in the E3A intrusion prevention capability are classified. The use of classified indicators and signatures within the E3A system has been a long-standing challenge for the NCPS program because of the unprecedented way in which classified information is placed on unclassified networks for the purposes of protecting unclassified .gov network traffic. The continued use of classified information in E3A has been recognized as a cost and schedule driver, as well as limiting the range of technical capabilities available. Moreover, the use of classified information has limited the ability of DHS to engage and communicate with the agencies it helps to protect because not all agencies have personnel with the appropriate security clearances to discuss the indicators or the alerts that are generated by the system. To address this issue, DHS has commissioned a study to understand the value of using classified indicators within E3A to determine if their use should be continued, or if DHS and the agencies would be better served by using only unclassified information.
Appendix D: Acquisition Pilot: Change the Buying Strategy to Government-As-One-Purchaser

Applying Nash Equilibrium to Federal Acquisition of Cloud Email

Several challenges must be overcome in the acquisition cycle in order to comply with EO 13800 and facilitate shared services, such as cloud email. Budgets are constrained by yearly appropriations, and agencies work autonomously, which reduces the Government’s ability to look at its purchasing as a whole. Legacy procurement and security regulations, coupled with lack of top down guidance for the logistics of a Government-wide migration to cloud email challenge cloud adoption.

By creating virtual “street corners” for cloud email providers the Federal Government can use competing market forces to drive Government-wide volume pricing as a lever to speed migration. This will apply Hotelling’s Law of spatial competition, wherein Government’s potential purchasing power will be used to negotiate tiered pricing agreements directly with the providers and result in publicly displayed price points, total number of licenses purchased, and the remaining number of mailboxes that need to be migrated. This volume pricing would serve as the base rate for any license purchased by the Government.

Dashboard Example (Cloud-Based E-mail)*

In this scenario, data would be recorded with the current negotiated pricing tiers, along with any incentive pricing based on other factors such as the company’s quarterly sales cycles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gmail</th>
<th>Quarter/ Price per user/month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Tier 1: 1 – 5,000 licenses | Q1-3: $10 per user/month  
| | Q4: $9 per user/month  |
| Tier 2: 5,000 – 10,000 licenses | Q1-3 $9.50 per user/month  
| | Q4: $9.45 per user/month  |
| Tier 3: 10,000 – 50,000 licenses | Q 1-4 $ 9.50 per user/month  |

*These numbers are fabricated for this example only.

A running total of the licenses purchased would be displayed so that at any time, end users would know the price point. This would be validated with the companies for the official count.

To date (6/29/17) Total Licenses purchased Government-wide: 1,345,000
Pricing Level= Tier 3, Q2 = $9.50 per user/month
Total mailboxes to migrate: 3,000,000

Benefits would include a more constructive and mutually-beneficial ecosystem with private sector companies, better and more transparent pricing for Government agencies, and an increased variety of available secure solutions. This would also lead to more consistent implementation and configurations across the Federal enterprise. Lastly, this would incentivize agencies with smaller budgets to adopt cloud email earlier.
Assumptions

This assessment relies on the following assumptions:

- Industry and private sector companies are not only willing to come to the table, but to actually collaborate with the Federal Government in pursuing this new approach to contracting;
- Industry must be willing to negotiate fair and reasonable tiered volume pricing that will be made public. Departments, agencies, and industry must agree on metrics and public reporting and tracking of agency adoption of cloud email adoption;
- Agencies must also be active in timely reporting of their data, which will be displayed publicly, in order to ensure as specific volumes are reached, discounts are provided; and
- The Government has the ability to negotiate a manufacturer’s agreement that will be accepted by agencies.

Why This Works

A common strategy for many chains is to locate near a competitor. For example, you will almost always see a CVS near a Walgreens or a Burger King near a McDonalds. You will see food chains across the street or next to each other in almost any city in the US. The thinking is that if it works for the competitor, it will likely work for you. Studies have shown repeatedly that as chains sprout up in adjacency, volume also goes up. This strategy is commonly known as the Nash Equilibrium, a solution concept of non-cooperative competition involving two or more “players,” where each player knows the equilibrium strategies of the others and no one has anything to gain by changing their own strategy.

Creating the Marketplace with Hotelling’s Law. In simple terms, Hotelling’s Law determines that businesses selling similar products tend to locate as close as possible in order to maintain the maximum amount of market share possible. Creating a public display and accountability to the total Government spend for the different types of cloud email and the number of mailboxes left to be migrated will create this marketplace.

This strategy also takes into account that re-sellers would still be able to sell these licenses under existing GSA Schedules or Solutions for Enterprise-Wide Procurement contracts; however, they would be required to use the current price point, record the sale into the dashboard, and make their re-seller fees transparent to Government as the differentiation in competition. Ultimately, this will save business development and contract negotiation time and effort between the email providers and the re-sellers, which will drive down the overhead fees the Government has to pay.

Services, configurations, and prices all negotiated openly and reported publicly will not only ensure the most competitive rates for Government, but also create an optimal strategy for the vendors themselves. This dis-incentivizes vendors from focusing on the highest possible price point for their services and, instead, refocuses the competition on performance and quality of the offerings as a distinguishing factor.

Pilot to Test the Hypothesis

The steps outlined below would be used to test the theory that this would change the way we buy these services and establish a shared service approach to license purchasing:
**Get Industry Buy-in and Feedback.** Capitalizing on the recent success of the IT CEO Summit, the Office of American Innovation will call a follow-up summit with interested cloud providers to discuss the proposal. The goal would be to determine whether CSPs would be willing to participate in a pilot of the Manufacturer's Agreements with the Federal Government. Suggested industry partners to target are Google, Salesforce, Amazon, and Microsoft.

**Measure the Market.** A prerequisite to all other actions is to obtain an accurate measurement of the market need in terms of agencies that have not yet transitioned to cloud email solutions. While we have clear data on implementation among the CFO Act agencies, currently there is no definitive data source of small and independent agencies adoption of cloud email. In order to negotiate effectively, knowing the size of the market is imperative, therefore we need a data call to all agencies regarding their current email contracts, prices, and number of mailboxes, etc.

**Establish Focused Pilots with Partners.** ATC and OMB will work with a small group of agencies to establish a pilot program to examine the impact of the process changes being proposed. Additionally, they will lead the creation of a series of support groups that would deploy to agencies to provide technical, acquisition, and migration assistance and report to ATC on the progress of the pilots.

**Create a Reporting Mechanism with Agencies and Industry.** The Federal Government requires that accurate and up-to-date data around the current state of both cloud and on-premises email adoption be reported by agencies so as to develop a baseline against which agency progress may be tracked. Industry sign-off on transparent reporting of units and volume pricing is essential to the success of this proposal. Without it, this strategy will ultimately fail. This is the foundation for achieving Nash Equilibrium for both the Federal Government and industry.

**Metrics of Success**

- At least one cloud-based email service provider has signed up to negotiate a memorandum of understanding within 90 days of the report being published, which would allow the Government to begin capturing FY 2018 spending on cloud email migrations;
- At least two agencies have signed on to pilot the proposed dashboard and provide reporting and acquisition of cloud email licenses under this effort; and
- Within 30 days of qualified purchases, agencies or re-sellers will record the sale in the dashboard.
Appendix E: Legal Considerations

Introduction

Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure requires this report to “describe the legal . . . considerations . . . relevant to . . .” transitioning agencies to consolidated network infrastructures or shared services. Exec. Order No. 13,800, 82 FR 22391, § 1(c)(vi)(B)(2) (May 11, 2017). This appendix, along with the report itself, does so. The report suggests increased use of consolidated network architectures and shared services. Generally, federal law contemplates that agencies control their own systems and information either directly or through contract. Moving to consolidated network architectures and shared services generally involves moving away from agency control and thus tends to increase tension with relevant law and requires greater analysis and legal documentation. While additional legal review and documentation would need to be performed during any eventual development of the consolidated network architectures and shared services based on their exact facts, implementation of the report’s recommendations can likely be achieved within existing law in most instances, as long as they are designed with a view toward satisfying applicable legal requirements. A summary of some of the main areas of law and legal issues implicated by this report are discussed below.

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA)

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) and later amendments are codified in subsection II of chapter 35 of title 44 of the U.S. Code. These provisions, which we will refer to here as FISMA, create a whole-of-Government approach to federal information security pursuant to which OMB oversees agency information security policies and practices; DHS administers implementation of these policies and practices for federal, civilian, executive-branch agencies, including by assisting agencies and providing certain Government-wide protections; and agencies are responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the potential harm to their agency information and information systems. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3558. FISMA also requires agencies to implement a minimum set of information security controls and techniques, assess the effectiveness of these controls, comply with NIST standards, DHS directives, and OMB policies, and report certain cybersecurity information to DHS, OMB and to Congress. The consolidated network architectures and shared services recommended in this report will need to provide levels of security and transparency that enable agency heads to ensure compliance with FISMA and its related requirements, while also providing technical solutions that fit the needs of multiple agencies.

30 In FISMA, the term “information security” means protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide—
(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; and
(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.
The Homeland Security Act’s Federal Intrusion Detection and Prevention System

The Homeland Security Act, as amended, requires DHS to “deploy, operate, and maintain” and “make available for use by any agency” capabilities to detect cybersecurity risks in agency network traffic and take actions to mitigate those risks. 6 U.S.C. § 151(b)(1). DHS currently provides these capabilities through its EINSTEIN program and, as required by law, ensures all retention, use, and disclosure of information obtained through EINSTEIN occurs only for the purpose of protecting information and information systems from cybersecurity risks. See id. § 151(c)(3). Federal law also requires agencies to apply these capabilities to “all information traveling between an agency information system and any information system other than an agency information system.” Id. § 151, note. Because this statutory mandate defines “agency information system” as any “system owned or operated by an agency,” the statutory mandate itself does not always require agencies to apply those capabilities to systems operated by contractors. But existing policy requires broader application of EINSTEIN, and DHS and agencies can choose to apply the capabilities to contractor-operated systems.

Privacy Statutes

There are many provisions of law and regulation that protect personally identifiable information by, for example, limiting access. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend IV; Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6(e)(2)(B) (grand jury confidentiality rule); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Privacy Act of 1974); 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (restrictions on access to tax return information); 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (Census confidentiality statute); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Wiretap Act); 6 U.S.C. § 151 (DHS’s Federal Intrusion Detection and Prevention System). Personnel operating consolidated network architectures and shared services described in this report will sometimes require access to such information. Technical capabilities and administrative processes will need to be developed to enable compliance with the laws and regulations applicable to each type of information. This will require a significant role for SAOPs and agency privacy programs.

Request for Information from Third Parties

Agencies receive requests for information in their possession through various means, including, for example, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, Privacy Act requests, congressional requests, Government Accountability Office audits, Inspector General inquiries, court proceedings, requests from the White House or other agencies, and other legal process. Legal agreements between shared service providers and client agencies will be required to define who will be responsible for responding to such requests when the information resides in a shared service in a way that satisfies legal requirements and provides agencies with sufficient control over their own information. Likewise, agency notices and regulations should adequately inform the public and others who might make requests of the appropriate procedures for accessing information.
The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA)

The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) increases the authority of agency Chief Information Officers to play a significant role in the planning, programming, budgeting, management, governance and oversight of federal information technology. 40 U.S.C. § 11319(b)(1)(A). FITARA is consistent with a move toward consolidated network architectures and shared services and enhances the legal authority for agency CIOs move in that direction. Among other actions, FITARA and associated policy require agencies to implement data center consolidation strategies that support (i) movement of information technology infrastructure to the as-a-service model and (ii) transition to the cloud. See 44 U.S.C. § 3601, note.

Procurement and Fiscal Considerations

Transitioning to consolidated network architectures and shared services requires consideration of how those products or services will be acquired and funded. In order to consolidate and share services with each other, Federal agencies will need to enter into Interagency Agreements or other appropriate agreements with each other that outline the parameters of their relationship and the applicable authorities that govern, for example, the acquisition of the products or services, how they will be shared and utilized by the parties, and how they will be funded and reimbursed. The specific authorities may vary depending on the circumstances and agencies affected, but may include:

- The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, which authorizes Federal agencies to enter into agreements to obtain supplies or services from another Federal agency and requires full reimbursement.
- Agency-specific authorities. For example, 40 U.S.C. § 501 authorized GSA to procure and supply property and services for executive agencies. The funding source utilized in conjunction with 40 U.S.C. § 501 will depend on which office within GSA is providing the property and services, but may include the Acquisition Services Fund (40 U.S.C. § 321), a Working Capital Fund, or other specific authorities. In general, full reimbursement will be required unless specifically authorized otherwise. In an example of such a specific authorization, 44 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(6)(B) authorizes DHS to “upon request by an agency, deploy[], operate[], and maintain[] technology to assist the agency to continuously diagnose and mitigate against cyber threats and vulnerabilities, with or without reimbursement.”
## Appendix F: Summary of Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible Party/ies</th>
<th>Action Required</th>
<th>Submitted to</th>
<th>Timeline (Upon Presidential Approval)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 ATC, GSA, OMB, DHS, Commerce</td>
<td>Release report for industry feedback, adjudicate recommendations, submit final report</td>
<td>The President</td>
<td>60 days</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Network Modernization & Consolidation
Prioritize the Modernization of High-Risk High Value Assets (HVAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible Party/ies</th>
<th>Action Required</th>
<th>Submitted to</th>
<th>Timeline (Upon Presidential Approval)</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 2 Department of Commerce | Provide a plan for revising Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199 and FIPS Publication 200 within the next year. The plan must include:  
- Proposed update to any other relevant NIST Special Publications to support the transition of agency compliance efforts away from low-impact systems and toward high-impact systems;  
The updates should include the use of the Cybersecurity Framework, and, where appropriate, incorporate lessons from other control and compliance frameworks.  
The updates should review security requirements for other frameworks and system approval processes, and assess the use of overlays of these frameworks into the proposed updates of the relevant Special Publications. | OMB | 30 days |
| 3 Agency CIOs, CISOs, and SAOPs | Review their latest submission of HVAs and make any necessary changes to reflect the latest information on system prioritization in tandem with the assessments made under their risk assessments as part of Section 1 of Executive Order 13800. | DHS and OMB | 30 days |
| 4 DHS (in coordination with OMB) | Identify common areas of weakness in Government HVAs and articulate them in a report to include:  
- Recommendations for addressing these risks; and  
- Past and current Risk Vulnerability Assessments and Security Architecture Reviews that DHS has performed on various agency HVAs. | POTUS | 60 days |
<p>| 5 OMB (in coordination with DHS) | Develop a strategy and framework for an approach to improve lines of authority and operating procedures across agencies to reduce enterprise risk and coordinate responses to cybersecurity incidents. | [For internal action] | 75 days |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>OMB (in coordination with DHS)</td>
<td>Update the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) metrics as well as the Cybersecurity Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) Goal metrics to focus on those critical capabilities most lacking in agencies. Focus review and oversight efforts on driving progress on these capabilities, specifically focused on HVAs.</td>
<td>Government-wide release</td>
<td>75 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Direct Government-wide mitigation actions, consistent with Executive Order 13800, to address common areas of risk identified in the Report to the President on Risk Management.</td>
<td>Government-wide release</td>
<td>75 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8 | Any agency that has an HVA identified as having a major or critical weakness in either a risk assessment, RVA, SAR, or IG report | Identify a remediation plan, including a proposal for accelerating modernization within one year and identification of impediments in policy, budget, workforce, or operations. The plan should:  
- Maximize use of shared IT services and consider application and data-level protections and the use of commercial cloud-based architectures; and  
- Prioritize existing financial and human resources and should identify other systems of concern that may suffer from similar issues not categorized as HVAs. | OMB and DHS | 80 days |
| 9 | DHS, OMB, and the NSC | Review HVA lists submitted to DHS by Federal agencies and produce a prioritized list of systems for Government-wide intervention.  
- Six HVAs will be selected to receive centralized interventions in staffing and technical support. | President's Management Council | 100 days |
| 10 | DHS (in coordination with OMB, USDS, and GSA) | Provide hands-on technical assistance to agencies in bolstering protections for systems identified through the process outlined above as having the greatest need for modernization. | [For internal action] | 100 days |
| 11 | DHS | Expand the availability of DHS RVAs and SARS for agency HVAs and work with OMB to refocus these engagements to concentrate on hands-on technical engineering interventions.  
Work with GSA to expand the visibility, offerings, and agency use of the Highly Adaptive Cybersecurity Services Special Item Numbers on IT Schedule 70. | [For internal action] | 100 days |
| 12 | OMB (in coordination with DHS, GSA, Federal agencies, other stakeholders) | Capture standard operating procedures for the protection of HVAs.  
Develop a playbook that agencies can leverage to expand this approach to other systems in a prioritized, risk-based fashion. | Government-wide release | 365 days |

**Network Modernization & Consolidation**

Modernize the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) to Improve Protections, Remove Barriers, and Enable Commercial Cloud Migration
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th><strong>OMB</strong></th>
<th>Submit a data call to agencies requesting submission of both in-progress and pending projects for cloud migration.</th>
<th>Government-wide release</th>
<th>30 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Agencies</td>
<td>Respond to OMB data call. Propose a cloud migration plan that highlights needed changes to requisite policies and capabilities to facilitate faster migration.</td>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Commensurate with timelines in the data call request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>GSA, DHS, OMB, NSC, USDS, and other relevant parties</td>
<td>Review agency data call responses.</td>
<td>[For internal action]</td>
<td>60 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Provide preliminary update to TIC policy that introduces 90-day spring during which projects approved by OMB will pilot proposed changes in TIC requirements.</td>
<td>Government-wide release</td>
<td>60 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Agencies</td>
<td>Require collection of metrics that will be used to ensure that any proposed policy change do not introduce an unacceptable level of cybersecurity risk.</td>
<td>OMB, DHS, NSC</td>
<td>90 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Kick off a 90-day sprint to validate particular case studies for Category 2 cloud migration projects.</td>
<td>OMB, DHS, NSC, GSA, USDS</td>
<td>90 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>OMB, GSA, and DHS</td>
<td>Using information gathered from previous actions, proceed with rapid updates to TIC policy, reference architectures, and NCPS operational models to facilitate outcomes in commercial cloud.</td>
<td>Government-wide release</td>
<td>180 days</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Network Modernization & Consolidation**

**Consolidate Network Acquisitions and Management**

|   |   | **DHS** | Provide GSA and agencies with baseline configuration guidance for Managed Security Services capabilities offered under EIS. | GSA | 60 days |
Develop a comprehensive acquisition strategy that provides a feasibility assessment and roadmap to accomplish the following:
- Provide a path for all small agencies to more easily and cost-effectively utilize EIS services;
- Review current security capabilities currently offered under MTIPS to ensure the capabilities provide adequate security within the current threat environment;
- Identify additional areas of opportunity outside of EIS to consolidate acquisition of cybersecurity services and products.

Determine the feasibility of establishing a centralized acquisition support function within GSA capable of performing cybersecurity-related contract management activities for small agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>21</th>
<th>GSA, in coordination with DHS</th>
<th>Government-wide release</th>
<th>90 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Support small agencies in the transition to EIS by consolidating requirements for small agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22</th>
<th>GSA</th>
<th>[For internal action]</th>
<th>None given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Provide guidance to small agencies on how best to leverage its cross-agency acquisition in order to optimize small agencies’ investments and management throughout the procurement process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>23</th>
<th>GSA</th>
<th>Small &amp; independent agencies</th>
<th>None given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Shared Services to Enable Future Network Architectures**

Enable the Use of Commercial Cloud Services and Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24</th>
<th>OMB</th>
<th>Government-wide release</th>
<th>30 days</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Issue data call that will have agencies identify systems that may be ready for cloud migration and can be migrated securely but have not yet migrated due to perceived or encountered difficulties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>25</th>
<th>Agencies</th>
<th>OMB</th>
<th>Commensurate with timelines in the data call request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Respond to OMB data call.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>26</th>
<th>OMB, in coordination with DHS and other Federal partners</th>
<th>Government-wide release</th>
<th>120 days</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Update the Federal Cloud Computing Strategy (“Cloud-First”), which will provide additional guidance to agencies on the most impactful use cases for cloud adoption and how best to conduct appropriate operational security in cloud environments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27</th>
<th>OMB, in coordination with the FAR Council, GSA, and DHS</th>
<th>Government-wide release</th>
<th>120 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Develop clauses that define consistent requirements for security, privacy, and access to data for use in cloud contracts.

**Shared Services to Enable Future Network Architectures**

Accelerate Adoption of Cloud Email and Collaboration Tools

|  |  |  |  |
| 28 | OMB | Establish a comprehensive strategy for driving the accelerated migration of agency email and collaboration tools to the cloud for departments and agencies who have still not adopted cloud-based email. | N/A | 60 days |
| 29 | OMB | Conduct a data call to agencies regarding their current email contracts, prices, and number of mailboxes. | Government-wide release | 30 days |
| 30 | Agencies | Respond to OMB data call. | OMB | Commensurate with timelines in the data call request |
| 31 | OMB | Convene a task force of agencies to finalize a set of requirements for both low and moderate security postures for email and cloud collaboration. | Government-wide release | 30 days |
| 32 | OMB | Issue updated identity policy guidance for public comment. | Government-wide release | 45 days |
| 33 | OMB | Assemble Acquisition Tiger Team, charged with drafting and disseminating a “quick start” acquisition package that can help agencies facilitate rapid license and migration service acquisitions. The package would include:  
- Market research,  
- Acquisition plans,  
- Templates for requesting quotes,  
- Identified sources of supply, and  
- Independent Government Cost Estimate calculation templates. | [For internal action] | 90 days |
| 34 | Acquisition Tiger Team | Send out Request for Information (RFI) or conduct other market research activities to find qualified small business and socio-economic concerns to leverage set aside programs and other authorities to streamline the migration acquisitions to the greatest extent possible to identify qualified 8(a) companies that are able to assist agencies with migrations to email cloud technologies. | Public release | 90 days |
| 35 | OMB | Create acquisition/migration cadres, consisting of information technology and acquisition specialists that will be sent to early adopter agencies to help with license and migration acquisitions-related challenges. | [For internal action] | 180 days |
| 36 | OMB, in coordination with GSA | Create a pilot new acquisition tactics for cloud email and collaboration licenses including but not limited to those discussed above and outlined in Appendix D. | [For internal action] | 240 days |

**Shared Services to Enable Future Network Architectures**

*Improve Existing and Provide Additional Security Shared Services*
<p>| | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>DHS in coordination with GSA and Federal agencies</td>
<td>Complete the acquisition strategy for new, long-term task orders to offer CDM lifecycle support. Award new, long-term task orders through the CDM Program to offer CDM lifecycle support to agencies and provide solution development and implementation for Phases 3 and 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Obtain FedRAMP assistance in developing a DHS ATO package compliant with the FedRAMP process. Submit a plan to OMB that details the expectations and timelines for onboarding non-CFO Act agencies to the SSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Complete the data exchanges between the agency- and Federal-level dashboards to provide enterprise-wide situational awareness of an agency's cyber posture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>DHS, in coordination with the Federal CIO Council</td>
<td>Implement a concept of operations for the Federal dashboard as well as procedures to manage cyber risks across the Federal enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>OMB, in coordination with DHS</td>
<td>Select agencies to provide SOC-as-a-Service offerings and to lead contracting efforts to offer commercially provided SOC-as-a-service for use across the Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>OMB (Selected Agency/ies)</td>
<td>Develop a pricing model in alignment with the cloud migration strategy and timeline outlined within the Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Work with SOC-as-a-Service providers to ensure that NCPS capabilities and outcomes can be achieved and that the visibility remains aggregated across cloud and on premise security capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>OMB (Selected Agency/ies)</td>
<td>Create pilot regarding their SOC-as-a-Service capability and identify initial agencies with whom they will collaborate and test access and visibility.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>